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Abstract
Privatization, or contracting with non-governmental agencies for provision 
of state or federally funded services, is a strategy that has gained recent at-
tention from policymakers as a potential tool for successful child welfare re-
form. The Child Welfare Privatization Initiatives Project was created in 2007 
as a joint effort between the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evalua-
tion. The framework identified by this project produced twelve key consid-
erations for states moving towards a privatized system. This case study con-
siders these twelve considerations in a description of the large-scale effort to 
privatize child welfare services in the state of Nebraska that began in 2008. 
Problems leading to a need for child welfare reform and possible factors that 
motivated policymakers to shift services from the public to the private sec-
tor are also described. While proponents of privatization appeared to expect 
rapid increased efficiency and cost-savings, this case study explores multi-
ple reductions in quality and availability of services for children and families 
served by the child welfare system that occurred during the effort. Further, 
the cost of child welfare services in Nebraska increased by 27% and the pri-
vate agencies invested over $21 million of their own funds as they attempted 
to uphold contracts. Recommendations for practitioners and policymakers 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
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considering participating in efforts to privatize child welfare services in the 
future are made based on Nebraska’s recent experience. 
Keywords: Privatization, Child welfare, Child maltreatment 
1. Introduction 
Privatization, which is a term that refers to contracting with non-
governmental agencies for provision of state or federally funded ser-
vices, is a strategy that has gained recent attention from policymak-
ers as a potential tool for successful child welfare reform (Westat & 
Chapin Hall Center for Children, 2002). Proponents of the strategy 
argue that the competition of the private marketplace creates incen-
tives for delivery of more efficient and effective services (U.S. DHHS, 
2007). It is argued that marketplace competition increases efficiency 
by making service providers motivated to be as productive as possi-
ble without wasted expense. It is also argued that effectiveness is in-
creased through creation of a situation in which providers most ca-
pable of producing desired outcomes of child welfare services are 
rewarded by continued and increased funding. Further, some view the 
private sector as more capable of developing new services and chang-
ing in response to consumer needs. Finally, consumer choice and com-
petitive bidding for government contracts is proposed to make agen-
cies more accountable for delivery of desired outcomes. There are 
certainly many examples of effective public–private partnerships in 
social-service delivery. For example, in the area of early childcare, a 
large pool of potential providers exists (e.g., in-home daycares, church 
centers) and many families qualify for federal assistance with cover-
ing the cost of childcare. In this area, federal funding agencies have 
developed successful partnerships with private providers by increas-
ing funding to those demonstrating delivery of high quality care (Zell-
man & Perlman, 2008). 
Not all observers agree that the aforementioned benefits will nec-
essarily result from the privatization of child welfare services. Crit-
ics argue that the potential benefits of moving social services such as 
child welfare to the private sector are difficult to achieve and measure 
(Smith & Lipsky, 1992). When state governments offer contracts for 
private companies to deliver a service they once controlled, they cre-
ate a sit uation wherein the government is the only authorized buyer 
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of these services and thus there is no oversight ensuring that the 
highest quality or most effective service providers are awarded con-
tracts. Further, if an ample pool of potential providers does not exist 
in a given area, there will be additional lack of competition. Unlike in 
other marketplaces, where consumers create accountability by choos-
ing not to purchase inadequate goods or services, those served by the 
child welfare system rarely are able to make choices regarding the ser-
vices they receive. Therefore, critics argue, privatization is unlikely to 
lead to more effective services unless the government closely moni-
tors and evaluates service provision. Further, the costs of monitoring 
the private system and increased administrative responsibilities as-
sociated with overseeing contracts with private agencies reduce any 
cost efficiency gained from competition. Critics also warn that mov-
ing child welfare services to the private sector may create incentives 
for agencies to increase profits by providing less costly and potentially 
less effective services (Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004). Some worry that 
after agencies have been awarded government contracts, in the ab-
sence of careful monitoring, they can reduce costs and increase profits 
through methods that diminish the quality of services for children and 
families, such as hiring less expe rienced staff, increasing worker case-
loads, and providing lower levels of supervision. 
While many states provide portions of their child welfare ser-
vices through contracts with non-governmental agencies, statewide 
privati zation efforts in Florida, Kansas, and most recently, Nebraska 
are unique for their inclusion of all children in the child welfare sys-
tem and all elements of their foster care systems (Flaherty, Collins-Ca-
margo, & Lee, 2008; Nebraska Health and Human Services Committee, 
2011; Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004; Westat & Chapin Hall Center for Chil-
dren, 2002). The increased interest in statewide privatization efforts 
led the federal government to put forth a framework of recommenda-
tions for future endeavors. In conjunction with the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services (U.S. DHHS), the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) created the 
Child Welfare Privatization Initiatives Project (CWPI), which provides 
welfare admin istrators with information about the implementation of 
privatized services (U.S. DHHS, 2007). These recommendations tar-
get the justi fication for privatization, planning for and design of the 
effort, its implementation, and the evaluation of outcomes. 
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Although privatization is an increasingly popular tool, little re-
search has examined its success in improving services and outcomes 
for children and families (Flaherty et al., 2008). This paper examines 
Nebraska’s wide-sweeping privatization of child welfare services as 
a case study of changes in service efficiency and quality. The CWPI 
framework is applied to Nebraska’s privatization effort. The intent of 
the investigation is to provide insight into the complexity and chal-
lenges inherent to expanded private sector delivery of child welfare 
services. 
2. Background 
2.1. Deficits in services that created a need for child welfare reform in 
Nebraska 
Prior to 2009, child welfare services in Nebraska were administrated 
and delivered by the Division of Children and Family Services within 
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Nebraska’s 
privatization effort was partially driven by a need for child welfare 
reform that would allow the state to meet recommendations from a 
series of Child and Family Services Reviews conducted by the federal 
Children’s Bureau (DHHS, 2011a). In 2002, the Child and Family Ser-
vices Review (CFSR) assessed seven safety, permanency, and well-
being outcomes in regard to the provision of child welfare services. 
These outcomes were: 
1. Children are, first and foremost, protected from abuse and 
neglect. 
2. Children are safely maintained in their homes whenever possi-
ble and appropriate. 
3. Children have permanency and stability in their living 
situations. 
4. The continuity of family relationships and connections is pre-
served for children. 
5. Families have enhanced capability to provide for their chil-
dren’s needs. 
6. Children receive appropriate services to meet their educational 
needs. 
7. Children receive adequate services to meet their physical and 
mental health needs. 
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The review identified specific items on which Nebraska met na-
tional standards; however, the state failed to achieve substantial con-
formity with any of the seven outcomes (U.S. DHHS, 2002). Follow-
ing the CFSR in 2002, Nebraska produced and implemented a Program 
Improvement Plan, grounded in “Family Centered Practice” in 2006 
(DHHS, 2006). The proposed systemic changes to the child welfare 
system included a team approach to services and supports, a recogni-
tion that the role of supervisor is paramount to helping change occur 
within children and families, and the development of a Quality Assur-
ance system and protocols at both statewide and local levels. Further, 
in 2005, Nebraska received an incentive payment of $352,000 from 
the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) for completing 
more adoptions in 2004 than in either 2002 or 2003 (DHHS, 2006). 
Despite the efforts made through the Program Improvement Plan and 
federal incentives to improve child welfare services, deficits in Ne-
braska’s ability to deliver child welfare services remained evident in 
the next CFSR, which occurred in 2008. When the final report from 
the 2008 review was released, Nebraska again failed to achieve sub-
stantial conformity with any of the seven outcomes described above 
(U.S. DHHS, 2009). 
In addition to pressure to reform child welfare (and improve ser-
vices for children) in an effort to meet recommendations from the 
CFSR, Nebraska state government was simultaneously under pres-
sure to reduce the cost of child welfare services. For many years, Ne-
braska had documented a rate of out-of-home placement of children 
that was particularly high when compared to other states. In the years 
2005 through 2007, Nebraska’s rate of out-of-home placement of chil-
dren was 12% — double the national average of 5.6% (Platte Institute 
for Economic Research, 2009). When children are placed out-of-home 
following child maltreatment, federal policy stipulates that they re-
ceive services that are only partially reimbursed through federal Social 
Security entitlement funds. Therefore, state spending on non-reim-
bursed services for the increasing number of children placed out-of-
home created a fiscal problem for Nebraska. Further, many saw enti-
tlement funding as creating a financial incentive for placing children 
in out-of-home care and a hindrance to provision of services aimed 
at family preservation because children could only access these par-
tially reimbursed services if they were placed out-of-home (Platte In-
stitute for Economic Research, 2009). Proponents of Nebraska’s efforts 
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to reform child welfare services through privatization argued that the 
state could resolve this dilemma by creating contracts with private, 
for-profit agencies that would include incentives for both keeping chil-
dren safe and preserving families (Young, 2009b). 
2.2. History 
In September 2008, Nebraska’s Division of Children and Family Ser-
vices released their Recommendations for the Reform of Out-of-Home 
Care (DHHS, 2008). Under the proposed framework, the Division of 
Children and Family Services would maintain responsibility for “ini-
tial assessments of child or community safety and…for all key case 
decision making, such as decisions related to safety assessments, case 
plans and court reports, treatment needs, and recommendations for 
case closure, including adoptions” (DHHS, 2008, p. 2). Responsibility 
for day-to-day provision of child welfare services and services coor-
dination was to be allocated to private, contracting agencies (DHHS, 
2008). Thus, lead agencies were to be responsible for almost all ser-
vices provided directly by professionals to families in the child wel-
fare system, including foster care, mental health treatment, supervised 
visits, and other assistance in carrying out case plans. By July 2009, 6 
private, not-for-profit “lead agencies” had signed “implementation” 
contracts with the state (DHHS, 2011a). These contracts required the 
agencies to develop plans and hire staff capable of providing child wel-
fare services and coordination. 
Each lead agency was responsible for service provision across 
specific counties and regions of the state. Nebraska is largely rural 
and sparsely populated, with approximately 1,856,000 people spread 
across 93 counties. The majority of the state’s population is located 
in just three counties in southeastern Nebraska; as such, the number 
of cases that each lead agency was responsible for did not reflect the 
amount of land they served. Table 1 provides a summary of each lead 
Agency and its contract with the State. Agency 1 oversaw five part-
ner agencies providing services for children and families in partially 
urban south eastern Nebraska. Agency 1 was responsible for approx-
imately 2400 children (DHHS, 2011a). Agency 2, based in neighbor-
ing state Kansas, was responsible for serving approximately 3600 
children and began providing services in both urban and rural east-
ern and southeastern counties in November 2009. However, Agency 
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2 did not have a Nebraska headquarters until late December of that 
year (Boettcher, 2009). Agency 3, an Iowa-based organization, was re-
sponsible for the provision of services in rural central, western, and 
northern Nebraska. Responsible for 50 subcontracting service-provid-
ing agencies across 71 counties, Agency 3 agreed to oversee approx-
imately 1300 cases (DHHS, 2011b). Sixteen urban and rural counties 
in southeast Nebraska received services under the oversight of lead 
Agency 4. Agency 5 was responsible for the provision of services in a 
portion of southeastern Nebraska, an area containing 12 rural coun-
ties. Agency 6 was slated to become a lead agency across Nebraska’s 
central and western counties. 
The six lead agencies that signed implementation contracts were 
subject to new risk-based reimbursement procedures (rather than the 
former fee-for-service system), a child welfare reform strategy that 
Table 1. Summary of lead agency’s state contracts.
 Area(s) of  Approximate Approximate Contract Summary of reason for contract  
 service provision  number of  start date termination  termination
  families to be  of service date 
  served provision
Agency 1 Urban and rural 2400 November 2009 — — 
 southeastern counties
Agency 2 Urban and rural 3600 November 2009  February 2012  Desire to return to fee-for-service 
 southeastern and     system, inability to operate 
 eastern counties    within projected budget
Agency 3  Rural central, western,  1300 November 2009  September 2010 Increased costs due to administration 
 and northern counties    responsibly shared with the State,
     inability to operate within projected   
     budget
Agency 4 Urban and rural 1000 November 2009   April 2010  Inability to operate within projected
 southeastern counties    budget, bankruptcy
Agency 5 Rural southeastern  400  November 2009  April 2010  Increased costs due to shared case 
 counties     planning responsibilities with the
     State, inability to operate within   
     projected budget
Agency 6 Rural central and  — Never provided  October 2009  Viewed allocated funds as insufficient 
 western counties  services  for covering cost of agency service   
    provision
All agencies had signed implementation contracts with the state by July of 2009. Full implementation of contracts was required by April 1, 2010.
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borrows heavily from managed health care principals. In a risk-based 
payment system, service providers are granted a fixed payment in ad-
vance that is theoretically based on a prospective estimate of the cost 
of service delivery. One potential advantage of a risk-based payment 
system is reduction of a key challenge to traditional fee-for service 
systems: the fact that favorable changes in utilization of services for 
children placed out-of-home are accompanied by reductions in federal 
entitlement funds (Wulczyn, 2000). For example, in a traditional fee-
for-service system, an agency that safely reunited children with their 
families quickly would receive fewer federal dollars than a slower 
moving agency due to the greater amount of foster care service uti-
lized by children served by the slower moving agency. However, pro-
spective payments also inherently redistribute the financial risk in-
volved with service delivery away from the funder to the provider, a 
feature that often leads to anxiety among providers about their abil-
ity to stay within a projected budget (Wulczyn, 2000). 
Worries about ability to deliver services to children and fami-
lies while staying within projected budgets were certainly present 
as agencies in Nebraska negotiated with DHHS. In October 2009, 
Agency 6 announced that it would not sign a second contract to pro-
vide child welfare services. A local newspaper reported that after 
learning that its contract would be about 1 million dollars less than 
expected, the agency director believed the “State had placed the 
[agency] in a position in which it didn’t make sense to move for-
ward” (Young, 2009a). Without the promise of service provision 
from Agency 6, Agency 3 became the only provider of services to ru-
ral central, western, and northern Nebraska. While the remaining 
five agencies signed contracts agreeing to continue to provide ser-
vices, they also told news media of worries about the financial risks 
they would be taking on and their ability to provide services with 
the limited amount of funding they would be provided by the state 
(Young, 2009a). The DHHS contracts underwrote the costs of ser-
vices, allocating approximately 2 million dollars fewer to the lead 
agencies than had been previously spent on service provision by the 
state itself (Young, 2012b). 
By April 2010, concerns expressed by the lead agencies about 
their inability to effectively deliver services using the funds budgeted 
by DHHS had become a reality. Agency 5 withdrew from its role in 
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the child welfare reform process, stating that, partially due to the in-
creased cost that had occurred as a result of both the agency and the 
state being responsible for case planning, it had incurred significantly 
more expenses than projected and would no longer be able to operate 
if they were to continue losing money (Young, 2010a). Also in April 
2010, Agency 4 filed for bankruptcy, partially due to the increased 
costs experienced during privatization, and the state shortly there-
after terminated its contract with the Agency (Stoddard, 2010). The 
abrupt ending of this agency’s contract led to a need for DHHS to im-
mediately provide continued foster care, mental health treatment, and 
supervised visits with parents for approximately 2000 children served 
by child welfare (Stoddard, 2010). In September 2010, Agency 3 an-
nounced that, due to inability to handle administration, billing, and 
subcontractor payments, it had mutually agreed to terminate its con-
tract with DHHS (Young, 2010c). 
By October 2011, DHHS had reassumed responsibility for pro-
vision of services to children living in the large rural portion of Ne-
braska once served by Agency 3 and had provided additional funding 
to the two remaining agencies, who continued to provide services to 
children in the partially-urban southeastern portion of the state (Ne-
braska Foster Care Review Board, 2011). At a briefing to DHHS in 
November 2010, legislators and agency directors expressed concern 
about the ability of the two remaining lead agencies to manage the 
child welfare cases in southeastern Nebraska (DHHS, 2011a). Despite 
these concerns, Nebraska Governor Heineman authorized increased 
funding to the two remaining agencies in accordance with a plan to 
transfer additional case management responsibilities to these agen-
cies. Even with increased funding, Agency 2 continued to struggle with 
budgeting for service provision through the risk-based reimbursement 
system and attempted to negotiate with DHHS to return to a fee-for-
service system (Young, 2012a). The two parties were unable to come 
to an agreement regarding funding, leading DHHS and Agency 2 to 
terminate their contract in February 2012 (Stoddard, 2012a). Follow-
ing termination of its contract with Agency 2, DHHS reassumed re-
sponsibility for the large majority of child welfare services; by the end 
of February 2012, Agency 1 was providing services to children in Ne-
braska’s largest city, while DHHS was again providing services to the 
remainder of the state (Stoddard, 2012a). 
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3. Changes in services for children and families that followed 
privatization 
On January 14, 2011, the Nebraska Unicameral Legislature intro duced 
and passed a resolution (LR 37) authorizing the Health and Human 
Services Committee to investigate and assess the state’s attempt to re-
form child welfare services through privatization (DHHS, 2011a). The 
report completed by this committee, entitled “DHHS Privatization of 
Child Welfare and Juvenile Services” (hereafter referred to as the per-
formance audit; DHHS, 2011a) provided the legislature with a detailed 
timeline of the events leading to privatization and findings regard-
ing DHHS’ adherence to their responsibility to protect the welfare of 
children. Overall, the performance audit that was generated as a re-
sult of this legislation was negative and pointed to multiple deficits 
in services for children and families served by the child welfare sys-
tem that occurred during the reform effort. 
The financial audit included in the performance audit confirmed 
the agency director’s initial concerns about the ability to provide ser-
vices within capitated budgets proposed by the state. The cost of child 
welfare services in Nebraska increased by 27% over the course of the 
reform effort and the private agencies invested over 21 million dol-
lars of their own funds as they attempted to uphold contracts (DHHS, 
2011a). Further, throughout the privatization effort, the intended im-
provements in the range and quality of services for children and fam-
ilies did not occur. During the privatization effort, the statewide rate 
of maltreatment reoccurrence after a child was referred to the system 
remained above national standards and there was no significant re-
duction in the number of children in out-of-home care (DHHS, 2011a). 
The performance audit also concluded that instability resulting 
from sequential ending of contracts by lead agencies led families to 
experience frequent changes in their caseworkers and treatment pro-
viders (DHHS, 2011a). Further, the lead agency’s inability to operate 
within the budgets they were provided by DHHS led to reduced options 
for children in need of out-of-home care. Agencies were frequently un-
able to pay sub contracts to group homes and shelters and subsidies 
to foster parents and; therefore, homes and shelters closed and fos-
ter parents were unable or refused to provide care for new children. 
Finally, the performance audit found that lead agencies were unable 
to comply with the administrative requirements of their contracts 
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with the state. Review of agency records found non-compliance with 
state requirements for reporting caseworker changes, child placement 
changes, and other documentation in children’s files. 
In response to the performance audit, the legislature promised 
increased transparency during the 2012 session and began holding 
public hearings on the reform efforts. In March 2012, the state re-
sumed control of the child welfare system and the legislature passed 
five bills that created a foundation for improved provision of ser-
vices. This package of bills included the creation of the Nebraska Chil-
dren’s Commission and the Inspector General for Child Welfare (LR 
821), updated provisions related to case management and caseloads 
(LR 961), and requirements for foster care licensure and funding (LR 
820). Additionally, LR 949 required the development of a strategic 
plan including goals, benchmarks, and progress reports and the cre-
ation of a separate child welfare budget (Hein & Roush, 2012). Ne-
braska DHHS was also required to develop a statewide child welfare 
information system (LR 1160). Though initially opposed to the legis-
lation and in favor of continuing within the privatized system, Gov-
ernor Heineman signed the package of bills in April 2012. This col-
laborative reform process occurred in stark contrast to the original 
privatization effort, which was enacted by DHHS without input from 
the legislature or other key stakeholders. 
On July 6, 2012, Governor Heineman released a statement re-
garding the current state of child welfare reform in Nebraska, identi-
fying the rate of out-of-home placement at twice the national average 
as a significant area of concern (Heineman, 2012). Further informa-
tion was provided regarding the role of the Nebraska Children’s Com-
mission (LR 821) in assisting the development of the strategic plan 
for welfare reform and a timeline for monthly meetings through No-
vember 2012. Governor Heineman reiterated that budget issues re-
lated to the welfare reform recommendations remain a concern, in-
dicating that increased funding for the child welfare system would 
potentially reduce the state’s ability to provide for K-12 schools and 
higher education. 
In August 2012, Nebraska received the first of three expected pen-
alties for failing to comply with federal regulations regarding the use 
of foster care funds under privatization from fiscal years 2010, 2011 
and 2012 (Stoddard, 2012c). Though Nebraska had not sought required 
federal approval for any contracts put in place during privatization, 
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the current DHHS Children and Family Services director reported that 
the department had been working closely with the federal government 
to ensure compliance since March 2012. In addition to complying with 
federal guidelines, Nebraska had been implementing requirements 
identified under the new legislation in an attempt to rapidly fix the 
failed system. The Foster Care Review Board was replaced by an advi-
sory board consisting of five members, tasked with stabilizing the pro-
vision of services through collaborations with the legislature (Young, 
2012b). A standardized system of assessing risk and making a deter-
mination of services, Structured Decision Making, was im plemented 
statewide; by October of 2012, the number of children in the child wel-
fare system had reached a 12-year low (Stoddard, 2012d). On Decem-
ber 14, 2012, the Nebraska Children’s Commission (LR 821) proposed 
its strategic plan for improving outcomes for children and families 
in the child welfare system. The identified goal is for this framework 
to become more detailed throughout 2013 through collaborations be-
tween the Commission, the Children and Family Services Division of 
DHHS, and the legislature (Young, 2012d). 
4. Factors that may have affected Nebraska’s readiness to move 
to a Privatized System 
In seeking to understand the reasons underlying the failure of Ne-
braska’s statewide child welfare privatization effort, it is instructive 
to examine earlier efforts to synthesize the lessons learned from pre-
vious privatization efforts. The CWPI (U.S. DHHS, 2007) reviewed 
existing successes and failures of statewide and local child welfare 
privatization, and produced a report that includes twelve key consid-
erations for states wishing to move towards a privatized system. Un-
fortunately, Nebraska’s Health and Human Services Committee review 
of the state’s privatization effort clearly indicates that these and other 
similar recommendations for privatization were not fully taken into 
account. Below, 10 of the 12 key considerations that are most appli-
cable to understanding the failure of Nebraska’s privatization effort 
are examined. Factors that may have affected Nebraska’s readiness to 
move to a privatized system are also organized across these 10 con-
siderations in Table 2. 
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Child welfare privatization initiatives project key 
consideration 
Why privatize? 
What is the level of stakeholder support for 
privatization? 
Has the public agency set aside enough time 
for planning and designing the initiative? 
Are there sufficient administrative and cost 
data to develop contracts and estimate case 
rates and other service costs? 
Is there viable competition in the community to 
provide the targeted services? 
Do providers have sufficient skills and 
administrative capacity to manage large-
scale contracts and monitor service delivery 
and client outcomes? 
Do private agency front-line staff have 
sufficient skills and knowledge about child 
welfare policies and evidence-based reform 
to deliver services? 
Is the public agency prepared to design a 
new service delivery system and assume 
new roles focused on contract design, 
procurement, and monitoring? 
Are roles and responsibilities clear between the 
public and private sectors? 
Will privatizing services alone bring about 
improved outcomes or will the agency need 
to implement other reforms in tandem with 
privatization? 
Circumstances and conditions in Nebraska during initial stages of 
privatization
• Pressure to quickly improve child welfare services due to failed Child 
and Family Services Reviews and media attention on high profile 
child welfare cases 
• Desire to reduce State spending 
• Executive branch engaged in privatization process without 
involvement of the legislature 
• Community critical of rapid switch to privatized system and lack of 
careful planning 
• No evidence of acute crisis within the child welfare system 
• Full-scale implementation of initiative after 10 months of planning 
• No cost–benefit analysis preformed prior to initiative 
• Goals, benchmarks, and timeframes poorly defined 
• Lead agencies had little-to-no experience with provision of Child 
Welfare services in Nebraska 
• Very few available providers of child welfare services 
• Little-to-no competition among agencies bidding for government 
contracts 
• General lack of skilled child welfare professionals in the job market 
• Lead agencies had little-to-no experience managing large-scale 
contracts or coordinating community-based services 
• Contracts awarded to agencies without evaluation of skills/capacity 
• Historical State difficulties with hiring and retaining well-trained child 
welfare professionals 
• Lead agencies inexperienced in hiring and training qualified staff 
• State agencies with expertise in planning and execution of public–
private contracts were not consulted in planning the initiative 
• Executive branch allocated unrealistically low budgets for lead 
agencies 
• Goals, benchmarks, and timeframes poorly defined 
• Frequently shifting and poorly defined State and private roles and 
responsibilities 
• No logical model identified for linking the initiative to the State’s 
current difficulties in child welfare service delivery 
• Lowering State spending was a major goal for the reform, however it 
was not clear how this outcome would improve services for children 
and families
Table 2. Factors that may have affected Nebraska’s readiness to move to a privatized system. 
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4.1. Key considerations 
4.1.1. Why privatize? 
Nationally, there are several key arguments that are used in support 
of privatization of public social services, central to which are poten-
tial for reducing government spending and improving the quality of 
government services (Winston, Burwick, McConnell, & Roper, 2002). 
These arguments are based primarily on the basic economic tenet that 
a competitive marketplace will lead to less costly but higher quality 
goods and services. By definition, for a marketplace to produce com-
petition, a range of alternatives must exist among which buyers can 
choose among (Van Slyke, 2003). When this tenet operates success-
fully and consumers have the knowledge and ability to select superior 
alternatives, providers deliver the best and most cost-effective ser-
vices possible because, if they do not, they will lose contracts or cli-
ents to more successful providers. Proponents also often believe that a 
larger body of skilled workers exists in the private sector and that the 
private sector has greater flexibility to recruit and hire skilled work-
ers and deliver quality services due to the relative absence of bureau-
cracy commonly found within the public sector (Winston et al., 2002). 
Despite the logic inherent in these arguments, evidence from 
states that have attempted to privatize child welfare services indi-
cates that privatization alone is not capable of improving the qual-
ity of child welfare services or reducing their cost (U.S. DHHS, 2007). 
A study of six states’ (i.e., Kansas, Florida, Missouri, Ohio, Michi-
gan, and Maine) efforts to privatize child welfare services conducted 
by Children’s Rights concluded that given the cost of providing and 
overseeing quality child welfare services to families, public agencies 
should not expect cost-savings to come from privatization (Freun-
dlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). In Kansas, a state that shares a border 
with and is similar to Nebraska in terms of population demographics 
and geographic distribution, a statewide effort to privatize child wel-
fare services that began in 1996 resulted in significant financial losses 
for contracting providers (Unruh &Hodgkin, 2004). The child welfare 
system serves a population of families with complex and difficult-to-
treat problems and working with such families is often emotionally 
trying. These stresses and challenges lead to difficulty in finding and 
retaining a high quality workforce and demonstrating that services 
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are effective regardless of the source (public, private) of service pro-
vision (Winston et al., 2002). 
Given the failure of previous privatization efforts to reduce costs 
or enhance service quality or availability, the CWPI recommends that 
states carefully and systematically consider their reasons for priva-
tization before making changes (U.S. DHHS, 2007). The capability of 
the private sector to adequately deliver services must be carefully as-
sessed. Further, cost savings should not be a key reason for privati-
zation, as they may not materialize. As described above, the primary 
motivating factors for privatization in Nebraska appeared to be a need 
to reform the child welfare system to quickly meet established stan-
dards, indicated by both the 2002 and 2008 Child and Family Service 
Reviews (DHHS, 2011a) and a desire to reduce state spending on non-
reimbursed entitlement services. Despite clear recommendations ad-
vising against the use of such factors as impetus for privatization, this 
rationale spurred Nebraska to move rapidly towards reform efforts. 
The state executive branch also appeared to rush towards privatiza-
tion following a number of high profile cases involving the child wel-
fare system (Schulte, 2012). Proponents of the privatization effort ar-
gued that competition within the private market place would lead to 
reduced government spending and higher quality services (Young, 
2009b). However, for several of the agencies involved with the ef-
fort, their contract with the state represented their first foray into 
the provision of child welfare services. They lacked any track record 
upon which one could reasonably predict they would have success in 
effective delivery of quality, low cost services. The legislative audit 
of the privatization effort found evidence that several of the agencies 
involved had not previously demonstrated the capability to provide 
needed child welfare services before the effort began (DHHS, 2011a). 
4.1.2. What is the level of stakeholder support for privatization? 
The CWPI recommends that states planning to privatize child wel-
fare services include service providers and stakeholders in the deci-
sion making process and adequately justify and explain the process to 
the public agencies involved (U.S. DHHS, 2007). Examinations of Kan-
sas’s recent large scale privatization process indicated that many key 
stakeholders had not been included in discussions pertaining to the 
planning and design of child welfare reform, creating problems during 
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the implementation process (James Bell Associates, 2001 in US DHHS, 
2007; Figgs & Ashlock, 2001 in US DHHS, 2007). In Kansas, failure to 
achieve buy-in and promote involvement from local agencies led to a 
concern about the capability of adequate service delivery from the pri-
vate providers. Conversely, a more successful, smaller-scale privati-
zation effort in El Paso County, Colorado placed a clear priority on the 
inclusion of stakeholders throughout the planning and implementa-
tion process, emphasizing ongoing communication once the private 
contracts were in place (U.S. DHHS, 2007). The smaller effort in El 
Paso County was centered around a clearly defined mission shared by 
leadership in several public agencies involved in child welfare: “elimi-
nating poverty and family violence” (Hutson, 2003, p.2). This mission 
was shared with and helped to foster engagement from recipients of 
services in the community, private and public agency staff, and pri-
vate and public agency leadership (Hutson, 2003). 
The performance audit conducted under the direction of LR37 re-
ports that Nebraska’s Executive Branch engaged in the privatization 
process with virtually no involvement of the legislature. While this ac-
tion was not judged to be a misuse of authority, neglecting to include 
the legislature as a key stakeholder represents a failure to adhere to 
best practices as outlined by the U.S. DHHS (2007) and supported by 
the successes and failures of prior privatization efforts. Nebraska’s 
DHHS did not seek approval from the legislature prior to privatiza-
tion because they were not intending to utilize additional state fund-
ing. In a media report on the privatization effort, a Senator from Ne-
braska’s largest city, Omaha, stated, “The executive branch and the 
Department of Health and Human Services set out on this adventure 
by themselves” (Schulte, 2012). 
The performance audit indicates that DHHS’s attempts to solicit 
feedback on the privatization effort from community stakeholders 
brought mixed feedback, and was certainly not fully supportive. The 
state solicited feedback on the initiative through email and public fo-
rums and was often criticized for moving too quickly without careful 
planning. Moreover, the performance audit’s review of this feedback 
indicated that prominent children’s advocates warned that agencies 
bidding for contracts would be unable to accurately estimate the costs 
of service delivery. Overall, the audit concluded that DHHS had not 
adequately engaged the full range of stakeholders and appeared to be 
somewhat unresponsive to stakeholder feedback (DHHS, 2011a). 
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4.1.3. Has the public agency set aside enough time for planning and 
designing the initiative? 
Research on privatization efforts has indicated that many states have 
released requests for proposals (RFPs) from private agencies with the 
intent to provide child welfare services within a short timeframe and 
without sufficient preparation, especially when faced with increased 
pressure from state legislatures and federal child welfare organiza-
tions (Kahn & Kamerman, 1999;Mahoney,2000in U.S. DHHS, 2007). 
Nebraska’s child welfare system received recommendations for reform 
in September 2008, after it was determined that the state did not meet 
adequate standards of care. While there was certainly a need for child 
welfare reform in Nebraska, problems highlighted in the 2008 re-
view were long standing and by no means evidence of a new or emer-
gency situation. Many states have experienced much greater turmoil 
in their child welfare systems, and federal or state courts typically in-
tervene when state agencies are unable to solve problems indepen-
dently (Golden, 2009). The system in Nebraska was not in such an 
acute state of crisis that administrators needed to engage in rapid re-
organization in a manner that Golden refers to as “building the plane 
while flying it” (2009, p. 19). Despite the lack of acute crisis, by July 
2009, ten months after the recommendations were received, six im-
plementation contracts had been signed by private agencies. The rec-
ommended time frame for states to plan and prepare RFPs is 12 to 18 
months (U.S. DHHS, 2007). 
4.1.4. Are there sufficient administrative and cost data to develop 
contracts and estimate case rates and other service costs? 
In order to effectively shift responsibility for delivery of child welfare 
services from the public to the private sector, it is extremely important 
that an accurate estimate of the cost of service delivery be derived (U.S. 
DHHS, 2007). Without an accurate estimate of funds utilized, caseload 
trends, service utilization, and performance in the current system, it is 
impossible to create benchmarks that hold private agencies responsible 
for improvements from the previous system (Golden, 2009). Similarly, 
it is equally important for private agencies to keep accurate records if 
privatization efforts are to demonstrate improvements. 
The performance audit conducted under the direction of LR37 
found that DHHS failed to conduct a cost–benefit analysis or assess 
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financial implications in any formal manner prior to privatization in 
2009 and failed to identify expected goals, benchmarks, or timeframes 
until well after the initiative had been implemented (DHHS, 2011a). 
Contracts and reimbursement amounts with private agencies were 
created based on the amount the state had previously spent on service 
provision, and were not adjusted to include the additional responsibil-
ities these private agencies were taking on (Stoddard, 2010). This was 
likely an especially detrimental mistake given the shift from a fee-for-
service reimbursement system to a risk-based system that was part of 
Nebraska’s privatization effort. In general, setting prospective rates 
for child welfare services is difficult because it requires a level of ac-
curacy in estimation that is beyond most child welfare systems, which 
is why risk-based systems are themselves risky (Wulczyn, 2000). 
As the privatization effort progressed, problems related to lack of 
an accurate estimate of costs continued. During the first year of ser-
vice provision under privatization, the state budget was cut such that 
contractors were not paid as much as had been originally agreed upon 
(Stoddard, 2010). Throughout the privatization effort, it was clear that 
the lead agencies were unprepared to manage costs within the new 
risk-based system: lead agencies voiced concerns continually through-
out the privatization process about their ability to deliver services us-
ing the budgets they projected when signing contracts with the state 
and multiple lead agencies were bankrupt by the time their contracts 
were terminated with the state (Center for the Support of Families and 
Hornby Zeller Associates, Inc., 2012). As a result, by July 2012, DHHS 
announced that the sole remaining private contractor would no lon-
ger be paid through a risk-based system and would begin paying for 
services on a case-by-case basis (Stoddard, 2012b). 
4.1.5. Is there viable competition in the community to provide the 
targeted services? 
If privatization efforts are to be successful, circumstances must ex-
ist that lead to market competition and create an incentive to deliver 
higher quality services at lower cost (Nightingale & Pindus, 1997). 
These circumstances include the presence of multiple competitors who 
will in fact compete to provide services. Further, once private agen-
cies have signed contracts with the government, financial incentives 
and disincentives (e.g., the possibility of losing a contract to another 
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agency if services are not effectively delivered) must continue to pro-
mote competition. When agencies submitted proposals and signed 
imple mentation contracts in the beginning of Nebraska’s privatiza-
tion effort, there was early evidence that this type of competition had 
not developed. First, the fact that two of the agencies that signed con-
tracts (Agencies 2 and 3) were based outside of Nebraska can be seen 
as evidence of the paucity of providers and the lack of agencies expe-
rienced in operating large-scale child welfare services. Problems with 
a lack of sufficient providers to create competition were especially ev-
ident in central and western Nebraska, where only one agency submit-
ted a bid to provide services. This should have come as no surprise, as 
the number and distribution of human service agencies in highly ru-
ral areas is an ongoing national problem. A Senator from this area of 
the state was quoted in the news media as saying, in retrospect, “Out 
here, we don’t have a lot of providers…looking back, that was a clue 
we had a problem” (Lauby, 2011). 
In addition to problems of limited competition brought about 
by the low number of existing service providing agencies, Nebraska 
largely suffered from an absence of competition within the job market 
of individuals with the skills necessary to provide child welfare ser-
vices. As identified in both the 2002 and 2008 federal CFSR of Nebras-
ka’s child welfare system, the state historically suffered from a short-
age of medical, mental health service, and foster care providers (U.S. 
DHHS, 2003, 2009). The small number of trained providers is further 
compounded by misdistribution of skilled staff across the State, and in 
many areas, there are simply not enough trained social service work-
ers to meet the needs of the children and families served by the child 
welfare system. Given the lack of available adequately trained provid-
ers of child welfare services in Nebraska, it seems unrealistic to have 
expected that private agencies could capitalize on competition within 
the child welfare services job market by accessing a pool of providers 
more capable than those that were part of the public system. 
4.1.6. Do private providers have sufficient skills and administrative 
capacity to manage large-scale contracts, and monitor service 
delivery and client outcomes? 
Most of the agencies involved had limited or no experience manag-
ing large-scale contracts or coordinating community-based services 
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(Young, 2012b). Several private providers were new to contracting at 
such large scales and thus lacked the experience and administrative 
capacity to effectively handle the necessary bureaucracy. Early in the 
process, Agency 6 determined that they had neither the funding nor 
the organizational experience necessary to manage its subcontracts 
with agencies needed to provide services, and elected not to sign a sec-
ond services contract. The limited allocation of state funds during the 
first year of privatization created additional challenges for the five re-
maining lead agencies, leading a representative from one of the lead 
agencies to state that they would need to be “very creative” (Young, 
2009b). The state audit identified a failure on the part of DHHS to 
evaluate and vet the lead agencies, thus contracting with organiza-
tions that had previously demonstrated inade quate skills and capac-
ity (Young, 2012b). For example, at the time the initial contracts were 
signed, Agency 3 was predominantly government funded, had inade-
quate assets, no credit line, and an insufficient cash balance, indicat-
ing that they would likely be unable to manage the increasing case-
loads under privatization (Overstreet, 2011; Schulte, 2012). Despite 
clear evidence suggesting that the private agencies were ill prepared 
to handle the administrative requirements of full-scale privatization, 
DHHS elected to proceed with the reform efforts. 
4.1.7. Do private agency front line staff have sufficient skills and 
knowledge about child welfare policies and evidence based reform to 
deliver services? 
Lead agencies in Nebraska faced additional challenges in regard to hir-
ing qualified front life staff. Nebraska has a paucity of in-state under-
graduate and graduate level programs with which to train case work-
ers and other direct service staff. It is estimated that fewer than 150 
students graduate each year with master’s degrees in social work at 
the University of Nebraska at Omaha, the state’s only accredited Mas-
ter of Social Work program (University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) 
Grace Abbott School of Social Work, 2013). Further, most of these stu-
dents do not go into child welfare, which is one of the most emotion-
ally taxing and poorly paid fields within social work. Compounding 
this problem of availability is the fact that most of the jobs created un-
der privatization were relatively low-wage positions, making them un-
attractive to many of the potential workers in the already limited pool. 
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Agency 3 struggled to recruit and train qualified staff. Front-line 
workers enlisted by Agency 3 often had no prior experience, limited 
education and struggled to interact within such a complex system 
(Lauby, 2011; O’Hanlon, 2012). Additionally, under LR568, the Health 
and Human Services Committee received feedback about concerns re-
garding quality and care of training (LR37). 
4.1.8. Is the public agency prepared to design a new service 
delivery system, and assume new roles focused on contract design, 
procurement, and monitoring? 
Deficits in the ability of Nebraska’s DHHS to successfully design large-
scale contracts were identified prior to privatization and highlighted 
within the state audit (LR37). DHHS failed to utilize the available re-
sources and expertise of Nebraska’s Department of Administrative Ser-
vices prior to or during the planning and execution of these contracts. 
Although the audit conducted under LR37 determined that DHHS met 
the minimum standards related to contract design, the omission of a 
cost–benefit analysis was considered a “critical error” and a violation 
of evidence-based practices. As a result, funds were awarded based 
on the amount previously spent by the state, with the expectation that 
private agencies would provide additional service coordination for an 
increasing population, for less money, while simultaneously obtain-
ing improved outcomes. The executive director of the Nebraska App-
leseed Center stated that these contracts required private agencies to 
“do the impossible” (Stoddard, 2010). 
The absence of clearly identified benchmarks and outcomes prior 
to implementation foreshadowed the inability of the state to effec-
tively perform their responsibilities regarding monitoring and over-
sight. Although oversight systems were identified in the contracts be-
tween DHHS and the lead agencies, there were no identified goals with 
which to hold lead agencies accountable (DHHS, 2011a). DHHS did 
not adequately monitor the contracts signed by private agencies and 
were thus unaware that subcontractors were often not paid for their 
services (Young, 2012b). At the same time, costs of service provision 
within agencies increased substantially, but the key players from the 
lead contractors have not been able to provide an explanation or any 
documentation (Schulte, 2012). 
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4.1.9. Are roles and responsibilities clear between the public and 
private sectors? 
The delineation of clear roles and responsibilities for all parties in-
volved in child welfare is one of the most challenging aspects of priva-
tization, compounded further by the fact that ultimately, the public 
agency retains responsibility for the quality of services, client out-
comes, appropriate use of public funds, and compliance with estab-
lished guidelines (U.S. DHHS, 2007). During large scale privatization 
in Nebraska, contracting agencies were expected to take over the di-
rect services operations of the child welfare system, including trans-
portation, family support, parenting education, foster care, and su-
pervision of any court-ordered visitation (Young, 2009b). DHHS was 
to retain case management oversight responsibilities (DHHS, 2011a). 
However, the legislative audit conducted under LR568 indicated 
confusion pertaining to the division of responsibilities, noting that 
portions of the plan were “pretty vague” (LR37). In October 2010, ap-
proximately one year after the services contracts were implemented, 
DHHS announced that they would be transferring additional case man-
agement responsibilities to the private agencies, but did not pro vide 
funding to cover these added services (DHHS, 2011a). Thus, private 
agencies were required to provide services beyond what had been 
originally included in their contracts and received no additional com-
pensation for doing so. The shifting nature of the division of respon-
sibility was seen as a barrier to effective collaboration. 
4.1.10. Will privatizing services alone bring about improved outcomes 
or will the agency need to implement other reforms in tandem with 
privatization to improve system performance? 
Privatization efforts do not exist in a vacuum, and need to be con-
sidered in the context of additional reform efforts and broader state 
and federal policy. It is unlikely that privatization alone will address 
the problems inherent in a system that serves a substantial number of 
children and families with very little funding (U.S. DHHS, 2007). How-
ever, as indicated in the 2002 and 2008 CFSRs, numerous domains un-
der the umbrella of service provision were identified as areas needing 
improvement, including response to and prevention of maltreatment, 
the responsiveness of the state’s case review system, and placement 
stability. The recommendations put forth from the CWPI suggest that 
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privatization of case management and a shift in the payment structure 
should be included as part of larger, state-wide reforms of the sys-
tem, rather than the entirety of the reform effort (U.S. DHHS, 2002). 
These recommendations did not appear to factor into the reform 
effort in Nebraska. Essentially, the privatization effort was never 
mapped onto the system problems identified in the CFSR process. 
The state did not explicitly outline benchmarks and outcomes prior to 
privatization, though identified goals included a reduction in the num-
ber of children in out of home care, and more broadly, the provision of 
improved services at lower cost. It was not overtly apparent how the 
privatization and reform efforts would address the individual areas of 
concern noted in the CFSRs, nor how privatization would lead to the 
identified outcomes. In other words, the state never specified a logical 
model linking elements of privatization to the outcomes of interest. 
The private agencies who withdrew from their contracts or whose 
contracts were terminated by the state cited a loss of significant funds 
as a primary factor (LR 37). However, prior research, along with pre-
vious attempts at statewide privatization (e.g., Kansas), have indi-
cated that these financial difficulties are not uncommon during the 
early stages of privatization efforts, and that overall spending tends 
to increase with privatization as compared to the costs of publically 
administered services (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Kahn & Ka-
merman, 1999). It would appear that all parties were relatively naïve 
regarding the immediate financial realities of privatization and the 
state did not have sufficient policies or funds in place to support the 
private agencies during the costly early stages. 
5. Lessons for child welfare practitioners and policymakers 
Practitioners and policymakers considering the privatization of child 
welfare services can use four clear lessons learned from Nebraska’s re-
cent statewide privatization effort to improve future initiatives. First, 
those involved in the planning and design of privatization should con-
sider the potential for increased short-term costs. Second, clear plans 
for the delegation of roles and responsibilities should be identified. 
Third, privatization efforts should be closely tied to desired outcomes. 
Fourth, policy objectives should be balanced by the realities of state 
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and local service systems. As demonstrated by Nebraska’s experience, 
conceptual limitations of privatization, such as the use of risk-based 
reimbursement procedures, are compounded by specific failures of 
planning and imple mentation, particularly financial and organiza-
tional oversights. 
Nebraska’s large-scale effort to privatize child welfare services 
provides evidence that, when considering the potential benefits of 
pri vatization, potential for increased costs (especially during initial 
stages) should be integrated into planning and contracts. As has been 
repeat edly true for other states (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003), Ne-
braska did not save money by privatizing child welfare services. Ne-
braska’s experiment with privatization provides a clear warning to 
other states considering similar initiatives: the cost of providing ser-
vices for the children that need child welfare services will increase 
if the government shifts responsibility for service provision to a pri-
vate agency while remaining responsible for oversight of these ser-
vices, at least in the near term. Despite contrary evidence, Nebraska 
appeared to expect that private agencies could serve families within 
a budget that allowed for the same amount of funding utilized by the 
state during the previous year (Stoddard, 2010). The fact that an ad-
ditional 3.03 million dollars was paid to contractors than originally 
planned should serve as a lesson to child welfare policymakers that, 
even if cost savings are theoretically possible though privatization, im-
plementing an initiative is inevitably accompanied by increased costs 
associated with transitions, start-ups, and new government monitor-
ing (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Platte Institute for Economic 
Research, 2012). 
Planning for increased costs is especially crucial if risk-based re-
imbursement procedures are to be a part of new contracts. Risk-based 
reimbursement procedures are largely based on managed health care 
principals, however, private agencies that serve children in child wel-
fare have not yet developed the sophisticated tools and technologies 
that managed health care organizations use to ensure quality care 
while limiting spending (McCullough & Schmitt, 2000). In the fu-
ture, pri vatization efforts, especially those that include a switch to 
risk-based reimbursement procedures, should consider the high costs 
that will be associated when private agencies work with the govern-
ment to develop a system for demonstrating that intended gains in 
service efficiency have been realized. It is important to point out that, 
Hubel  et  al .  in  Children and  Youth Serv ices  Rev iew  35  (2013)      25
as was true in Nebraska and as is unfortunately the national norm in 
the child welfare arena, there is little basis by which to predict how 
much quality, effective child welfare services should cost (Freundlich 
& Gerstenzang, 2003). Prior to privatization, Nebraska’s child wel-
fare spending did not lead to services for children and families that 
met national standards for safety, permanency, and well-being out-
comes. Thus, as is nationally the case, the public sector’s historical 
cost of service provision seemed an inadequate basis by which to pre-
dict how much spending would be needed on future child welfare ser-
vices. When privatization is considered as a possible tool for future 
child welfare reform, it should be kept in mind that realistic baseline 
estimates of need and service utilization are difficult to make in child 
welfare and, thus, it will be exceedingly difficult to ever be able to doc-
ument cost savings (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). 
Current difficulties with predicting the future cost of child wel-
fare services do not make increased efficiency through privatization 
impos sible, but overwhelmingly point to the need to tie budgets for 
contracting agencies closely to realistic estimates of potential spend-
ing by private agencies. Wulczyn (2000) details strategies for child 
welfare reform and strongly emphasizes the need for strategies for 
development of baseline budgets that allow agencies to plan for re-
source allocation over the course of a fiscal year. While these recom-
mendations are relevant for all future privatization efforts, context 
specific to Nebraska’s experience increased the difficulty of using this 
system of pay. Nebraska’s contracts with lead agencies would have 
likely been more successful if the budgets were based on accurate es-
timates of the number of children that would be served by the agen-
cies, the duration of children’s need for service from the agency, the 
costs of delivering service plans, and the administrative cost associ-
ated with working with the public sector to monitor outcomes (Wul-
czyn, 2000). Furthermore, these types of estimates would have been 
impossible to make given the timeline of Nebraska’s privatization ef-
fort. When contracts were awarded to lead agencies prior to any anal-
yses of cost–benefit or effort to predict the manner in which the shift 
in risk and responsibility would increase the overall cost of service de-
livery, both the state and the lead agencies were left with little basis by 
which to allocate limited child welfare funding. In future initiatives us-
ing private sector agencies for delivery of child welfare services, time-
lines should allow for careful analyses of projected agency budgetary 
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needs and planning for flexibility in situations where the frequently 
unstable costs delivering these types of services exceed expectations. 
The difficulties described above that Nebraska encountered with 
delegation of roles and responsibilities during the privatization effort 
also point to the importance of careful planning in child welfare re-
form. As is clear from Nebraska’s experience and from previous priva-
tization efforts in other states, shifting service provision from the pub-
lic to the private sector involves a great deal of change for all of the 
professionals involved (Flaherty et al., 2008). The child welfare ser-
vice system is complex and involves services aimed at a diverse range 
of goals (e.g., child safety, family preservation, foster care, adoption). 
As can be seen from the challenges encountered in Nebraska, vague 
stipulations regarding division of responsibility for these services and 
goals will impede the collaboration that must occur if government 
contracts with private agencies are to be successful. Similar to what 
was learned from Kansas’s recent effort to privatize child welfare ser-
vices, Nebraska’s attempt provides additional evidence that contracts 
with private agencies are likely to be unsuccessful if they do not con-
tain clear language about creation of new roles, expectations, and di-
vision responsibilities (Flaherty et al., 2008). 
The importance of closely tying goals for child welfare reform 
to improved services for children and families has been emphasized 
consistently in previous literature and is underscored by the results 
of Nebraska’s privatization effort (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). 
As described above, a significant area of concern noted in the per-
formance audit of Nebraska’s privatization effort was the failure to 
produce outcomes that addressed concerns noted in previous CSFRs. 
This was true in a smaller scale privatization effort that occurred in 
the late 1990s in Missouri, where poorly defined outcomes and meth-
ods used to assess outcomes led to difficulty measuring performance 
and an  inability to make changes consistent with CSFR recommen-
dations (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Given the overwhelming 
evidence related to the inability of privatization, particularly of child 
welfare services, to produce cost-savings, it is important that goals for 
the shifting of responsibility from the public to the private sector fo-
cus on addressing deficits in the current system. For example, in New 
York, the STAR (Safe and Timely Adoptions and Reunifications) Pro-
gram incorporates clear goals for improvement in timely moves to-
wards permanent placement into state contracts with public agencies. 
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Agencies able to demonstrate that they are able to increase discharges 
into permanent homes without a corresponding increase in re-en-
tries or transfers to other agencies are rewarded with increased gov-
ernment funding though flexible dollars that they are able to spend 
on a variety of services designed to further improve placement per-
manency. Innovations like the STAR Program suggest the possibility 
of successful outcomes, but highlight the fact that the ability to in-
corporate goals for improved outcomes into reform will require care-
ful foresight and planning: in order for agencies to participate in the 
program, they must provide historical data on outcomes such as time 
to reunification and time to adoption, demonstrating the need for 
thorough information gathering prior to public–private collaborations 
(Westat & Chapin Hall Center for Children, 2002). 
A final and overall lesson learned from the recent privatiza-
tion effort in Nebraska is the importance of balancing the realities 
of the state/local social service system with policy objectives regard-
ing government size and spending. The executive branch of Nebras-
ka’s government, which was solely responsible for the decisions that 
led to large-scale privati zation, highly values conservative govern-
ment spending and historically has made decisions that result in a 
financially secure state. Justifications for privatization of social ser-
vices are consistent with conservative values, which assume that re-
sponsibilities can be reallocated to private agencies so that govern-
ment size is reduced and funding can be restructured. This would then 
ensure that these agencies are motivated to work more efficiently than 
the public sector (Nightingale & Pindus, 1997). However, Nebraska’s 
experience highlights the importance of balancing these values with 
the realities of the local community service capacity and potential for 
development of marketplace competition between social service pro-
viders. Unfortunately, as has been true for other states that have at-
tempted to privatize child welfare services, Nebraska’s reform effort 
did little to address the underlying problem that the state’s capacity 
to serve children in child welfare is underdeveloped and hindered by 
a paucity of trained providers (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). As 
this case study has demonstrated, transferring responsibility from 
public to private agencies alone is unlikely to improve provision of 
child welfare services for children and families, a task that requires a 
highly organized system of care and commitment from a large body 
of dedicated and well-trained professionals. 
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